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In her Appellant's Brief, Tanya Wooden set forth legal and factual analyses on five issues 
that constitute grounds for remanding this matter back to the magistrate court for a new trial. 
The magistrate court's error consisted of failing to apply the proper legal presumption, excluding 
admissible evidence, allowing improper opinion testimony and making clearly erroneous 
findings with regard to material facts. Mr. Martin filed his Respondent's Brief, asking this Court 
to affirm the magistrate court's decision, in which he relies on reasoning and justification 
unmentioned by the magistrate court and that on the argument that the magistrate court's errors 
were harmless both individually and cumulatively. Ms. Wooden requests that the Court refrain 
from entertaining post hoc justifications and a reading that presumes proper reasoning in the 
absence of clear explanation. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY THE LEGAL 
PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE 
The magistrate court erred by failing to properly apply the rebuttable presumption of 
undue influence placed upon parties occupying the dual role of fiduciary and beneficiary. See In 
re Estate of Roll, 115 Idaho 797, 799, 770 P.2d 806, 808 (1989). Respondent's Brief begins its 
argument by identifying some factual differences between the fiduciary relationship that existed 
here and that found in the case of In re Randall's Estate, 64 Idaho 629, 132 P.2d 763 (1942); yet 
the brief stops short of arguing that the presumption did not apply here. Rather, Mr. Martin 
maintains that the magistrate court "recognized" the presumption and then considered evidence 
presented that rebutted the presumption. The magistrate court did not explicitly apply the 
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presumption. To the extent that the magistrate comi's reasonmg can be gleaned through 
implication, it reveals the court failed to apply the presumption. While Ms. Wooden contests 
whether Mr. Martin would have been able to rebut the presumption of undue influence, that point 
cannot be decided until the magistrate court actually applies the presumption. 
Ms. Wooden raised an issue of law as to whether the magistrate court committed 
reversible error by failing to apply the presumption of undue influence. To prevail on that issue, 
Ms. Wooden must demonstrate both that the presumption should have been applied and that the 
magistrate court did not apply the presumption. Mr. Martin did not argue that the magistrate 
court need not have applied the presumption. Thus, the question remaining before the Court on 
this issue is whether the magistrate court applied the presumption. 
Mr. Martin argues that the magistrate court's analysis of the undue influence factors set 
forth in Roll, subsequent to its presumption discussion, implies that the magistrate court applied 
the presumption and was determining whether that presumption had been sufficiently rebutted. 
This Court has stated the difficulties with inferring a trial court's decision based upon non-
specific findings and conclusions. See The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac, 130 Idaho 67, 70, 936 P.2d 
1309, 1312 (1997). In any case, the only inference that fits with the findings of the magistrate 
court is that it did not apply the presumption. 
The facts relied upon by the magistrate court in its presumption analysis reveal that it did 
not apply the legal presumption of undue influence. The magistrate court directed the parties to 
two facts it found important: (1) Mr. Martin was a co-guardian with his sister Tanya Viers and 
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Ms. Wooden had not alleged she engaged in undue influence; 1 and (2) Mr. Martin's guardianship 
was limited.2 The magistrate court only identified reasons why not to apply the presumption, 
and then proceeded to the four Roll factors. Mr. Martin maintains that by recognizing the 
presumption and then proceeding to the Roll factors, this Court can be confident that a proper 
analysis was performed. It should be noted that the Roll factor analysis must be conducted 
whether the court first applies the presumption of undue influence or determines the presumption 
does not apply. Therefore, Mr. Martin's suggestion that the court's Roll factor analysis implies 
an application of the presumption is without merit. 
The magistrate court's emphasis on the lack of evidence produced by Ms. Wooden that 
Ms. Viers exerted undue influence-combined with its erroneous finding that Ms. Viers was a 
co-guardian-evidences its understanding that a showing greater than an occupation of the twin 
role of beneficiary and fiduciary was required for the presumption to apply. The magistrate court 
used a similar approach with respect to Mr. Martin. It proceeded through the Roll factors to 
determine whether it would find undue influence, not with the presumption that there was undue 
influence. Had the court been engaging in an analysis as to whether the presumption had been 
rebutted, one would expect to see at least a single reference of the presumption during or after 
the court's Roll factor analysis. There is none. 
Mr. Martin concludes his argument on this issue by maintaining that substantial and 
competent evidence exists on the record for this Court to affirm the magistrate court's finding 
1 A clearly erroneous finding as set forth in Appellant's Brief and conceded in Respondent's Brief. 
2 Ms. Wooden set forth argument on why the presumption applies in her Appellant's Brief. Mr. Martin did not 
challenge that the presumption applied in his Respondent's Brief. Therefore, Ms. Wooden does not set forth further 
argument establishing that (I) the presumption applies and (2) no support exists in the law for applying some lesser 
level of presumption. 
-3-
that the presumption was rebutted. This is not an issue on appeal. In fact, it cannot be an issue 
on appeal, because Ms. Wooden has always maintained that the magistrate court never engaged 
in any such analysis. While Ms. Wooden disputes whether Mr. Martin will be able to rebut the 
presumption at a new trial, that dispute should not be settled before this Court on appeal. 
The magistrate court nowhere stated that it applied the presumption to Mr. Martin or that 
it found he affirmatively produced evidence rebutting the presumption. With no explicit 
language, we are left to draw implications from the court's analysis. That analysis implies that 
the court decided the presumption should not apply. 
B. THE STATEMENTS OF MS. CONWAY OFFERED BY MS. WOODEN WERE 
NEITHER HEARSAY NOR IRRELEVANT 
The magistrate court found that statements made by Ms. Conway before her death 
regarding her mental state and feelings toward her children were hearsay and irrelevant. Based 
upon that ruling, the magistrate coU11 excluded any testimony Ms. Wooden sought to offer about 
statements made to her by Ms. Conway, wherein Ms. Conway stated she was angry or distrustful 
toward Mr. Martin. That ruling stands in direct conflict to this Court's guidance in King v. 
MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272,278,410 P.2d 969,972 (1965). In answer to Ms. Wooden's analysis, 
Respondent's Brief sought to harmonize that conflict by presenting justifications not relied upon 
by the magistrate court. Furthermore, even if Mr. Martin's reasoning were relevant to this 
matter, it still fails to justify the magistrate's court's exclusion of these statements. 
Mr. Martin argues that King does not govern the evidentiary issues on appeal because the 
statements Ms. Wooden sought to offer were to general as to time, estate, and person. The 
record belies Mr. Martin's argument by showing (1) the broad nature of the ruling, and (2) the 
-4-
fact that the court made its ruling before Ms. Wooden could convey the statements. In the 
magistrate court's explanation of its ruling, it held that statements of anger toward a decedent's 
children were not relevant to the issue of undue influence. After the magistrate court declined 
counsel's offer to provide authority, Ms. Wooden was left trying to provide evidence of Ms. 
Conway's susceptibility to undue influence through her actions. Without the excluded 
statements, Ms. Wooden could not persuasively explain the causes of Ms. Conway's change in 
behavior. 
Mr. Martin also seeks to support the magistrate court's ruling by arguing that even if the 
court had recognized the guidance in King, Ms. Conway's statements still should have been 
excluded as falling outside the res gestae category. The record reveals that Ms. Wooden sought 
to present statements made by the decedent regarding her children----of whom Mr. Martin was a 
member-pertaining to their treatment of her and their lack of respect for her wishes. These 
statements were made to Ms. Wooden within months of her competency hearing and the meeting 
with Mr. Wasko which followed almost immediately afterward. These are the exact sort of 
statements found to be relevant and admissible in King. See King, 90 Idaho at 279, 410 P.2d at 
972. 
C. IDAHO COURT FILINGS MADE IN A PRIOR ACTION IN WHICH MR. 
MARTIN WAS PARTY SHOULD BE ADMITTED THROUGH JUDICIAL 
NOTICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THAT THE FILING WAS 
MADE AND THAT MR. MARTIN HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE FILING 
Ms. Wooden sought to admit filings made in a previous case, to which Mr. Martin was a 
party, regarding Ms. Conway's mental competency. As a party in that case, the offered filings 
were either made by Mr. Martin or he had knowledge of the filings. Mr. Martin argues that the 
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magistrate court properly excluded this evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 because the 
records offered contained statements that are subject to reasonable dispute. In order to determine 
whether evidence is (1) reasonably in dispute, (2) hearsay, or (3) relevant, the Court must 
understand the nature of the evidence and the purpose of its offer. Here, exclusion may have 
been proper had Ms. Wooden offered the records to establish the truth of the contents therein, but 
she did not. Instead, Ms. Wooden offered the filings to establish that Mr. Martin had knowledge 
of those statements prior to setting up the meeting with Mr. Wasko. There can be no reasonable 
dispute that these documents were filed and that Mr. Martin is presumed to have knowledge of 
filings in that case. 
Mr. Martin claims that Ms. Wooden offered the documents to establish Ms. Conway was 
incompetent. He then proceeds to argue that the results of a competency hearing are irrelevant to 
a hearing on undue influence and capacity. Mr. Martin bases his argument on the statutory 
provisions in Idaho Code §§ 15-5-101 et seq., stating that such competency determinations are 
not per se evidence of testamentary incompetence. Mr. Martin's contention that the records were 
offered to establish incompetency ignores the statement by Ms. Wooden's counsel that the 
documents were offered to show Mr. Martin's notice of those claims, not to establish the truth of 
the information to which he had notice.3 See Exh. Tr. 11/20/09, p.28, LL.23-25 & p.29, LL.1-3. 
Ms. Wooden sought to offer these judicial records to establish that they had been filed in 
a previous proceeding to which Mr. Martin was a party. Mr. Martin did not question the 
3 There are actually two problems with Mr. Martin's argument. First, he fails to address the reason for which the 
filings were actually offered. Second, even if the filings were offered as evidence of incompetency, that the Idaho 
Code §§ 15-5-10 l et seq. standard for competency and the probate standard for competency are not coextensive 
does not mean that it has no relevance, particularly under the inclusive language ofldaho Rule of Evidence 401. 
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authenticity of these documents (Exh. Tr. 11/20/09, p.28, LL.18-22) and, thereby, demonstrated 
that these records were not subject to reasonable dispute as to the purpose for which they were 
offered. As a result, the trial court should have admitted the documents under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 201. 
D. THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE OPINION OF 
ATTORNEY MICHAEL P. WASKO REGARDING MS. CONWAY'S 
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
The magistrate court allowed Mr. Wasko to opine that Ms. Conway had testamentary 
capacity at the time he drafted the 2004 Will, over Ms. Wooden' s foundation objection. Mr. 
Wasko was allowed to provide this opinion despite having never met Ms. Conway prior to the 
April 2004 meeting facilitated by Mr. Martin. Furthermore, Mr. Wasko had little knowledge 
regarding Ms. Conway's mental history or ability to be influenced by her children at the time he 
knew her. By allowing Mr. Wasko to give this testimony despite his lack of knowledge, the 
magistrate court treated the testimony as an expert opinion. In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. 
Wooden set forth why this expert testimony-in nature if not name-should have been excluded. 
Respondent's Brief avoids Ms. Wooden's analysis by representing that Mr. Wasko's opinion 
should be characterized as lay testimony. However, even if the Court accepts this argument, Mr. 
Wasko's testimony still lacked the foundation necessary to provide such lay testimony under 
Idaho law. 
Mr. Martin provides this Court with the precedent addressing lay opinions as to the 
competency of another: Weber v. Della Mountain Mining Co., 14 Idaho 404, 94 P. 441 (1908); 
Schwarz v. Teager, 44 Idaho 625, 258 P. 1082 (1927); and In re J-Jeazle 's Estate, 74 Idaho 72, 
257 P.2d 556 (1953 ). In each of these cases, the Court engaged in an analysis regarding the 
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relationship between a person's ability to transact business and competency. See Weber, 14 
Idaho at 413-14, 94 P. at 444; Schwarz, 44 Idaho at 631,258 P. at 1084; and In re Heazle's 
Estate, 74 Idaho at 76, 257 P.2d at 558. This similarity is no coincidence. The Court has created 
an exception to the general rule restricting lay witnesses from testifying to those things not 
perceived by the senses. However, the case law explaining this exception explains that it should 
be narrowly construed and that competency opinions should be restricted to those lay witnesses 
who have perceived the conduct of the person in question over time. Thus, by allowing Mr. 
Wasko to opine as to Ms. Conway's competency, the magistrate court either treated him as an 
expert or permitted lay testimony without the foundation required by Weber, Schwarz, and 
Heazle 's Estate. 
The Weber case dealt with whether a Mr. Watt had sufficient competency to sell his 
majority share position in the Della Mountain Mining Company. Weber, 14 Idaho at 408, 94 P. 
at 442. On appeal, the defendants challenged the trial court's refusal to permit testimony by 
several lay witnesses as to Mr. Watt's competency at or around the time of the challenged 
transaction. Id. at 413, 94 P. at 444. The Supreme Court found the trial court's exclusion to be 
error. Id. However, each of the witnesses proffered by the defendant "had known Watt 
continuously for a number of years, and ... they were acquainted with him during the times 
mentioned by plaintiff, and ... they were present at the time of these transactions and were 
familiar with his demeanor and conduct." Id. The Court mentions that each of these witnesses 
had continuous and intimate knowledge of Mr. Watt's professional dealings over time cannot be 
dismissed as immaterial, because following that recitation of facts and holding of error, the Court 
stated this rule: 
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It is too well settled law to reqmre consideration or discussion here that the 
competency or incompetency, sanity or insanity, of a person at the time of a given 
transaction may be proven by laymen or nonexpert witnesses with equal certainty, 
and often greater satisfaction than by experts, and the fact that a witness who has 
been acquainted with the person and has seen him frequently, and has been 
familiar with all his transactions, and has had business dealings with him, is 
himself not an expert on the subject of insanity, and is not versed in the medical 
science or has had no training or education along those lines, is no reason 
whatever for excluding his evidence on a question of common, everyday 
observation. 
Id. at 413-14, 94 P. at 444 (emphasis added). The Weber Court makes clear that while a 
nonexpert may testify to the competency of another, that testimony must be based upon a 
foundation of knowledge and familiarity with the person over time such that the witness is able 
"to make clear mental comparisons between the acts and conduct of a man who was at a given 
time sane, sound, and perfectly competent, and his acts at a time when he was laboring under 
mental disabilities." Id. 
The Schwarz opinion cites to Weber for the proposition that ''a nonexpert witness [may] 
testify as to sanity or competency of a person to make a will." 44 Idaho at 631,258 P. at 1084. 
While the Schwarz opinion provides little detail as to the required factual knowledge of a 
nonexpert witness regarding competency, this Court can find guidance in that the Schwarz 
opinion places the citation to Weber at the end of an analysis detailing the connection between 
competency and ability to transact business. Id. If presumed to be consistent with the Weber 
opinion to which it cites, the Schwarz Court reaffirms that nonexpert testimony must be founded 
upon a familiarity with the subject's ability to transact business both before and during the time 
in question. 
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The most recent precedent on this point, In re Heazle 's Estate, reaffirms that nonexperts 
who would offer testimony regarding competency must demonstrate familiarity with the subject 
over time. Like Schwarz, the Heazle 's Estate Court discusses the relevance of testimony 
regarding the ability of the person to transact business as it relates to competency. 74 Idaho at 
76, 257 P.2d at 558. Whereas Schwarz provides little factual background about the proffered 
competency witnesses, the Heazle 's Estate opinion provides details confirming the guidance 
gleaned from Weber. Like Weber, the witnesses in Heazle 's Estate "had known the deceased for 
many years, during which time they had various associations and conversations with her," and 
also interacted with the deceased on or around the time she executed her will. Id. at 75, 257 P.2d 
at 557. The I-leazle 's Estate opinion also provides helpful guidance into the dichotomy between 
nonexpert competency opinions and expert competency opinions, in that it discusses the 
testimony of Dr. C.R. Lowe, a mental ailments specialist who testified based on his knowledge 
and experience in the field. Id. Weber, Schwarz, and Heazle 's Estate all require greater 
foundation than provided here: either in the form of expert qualifications and expert review, or in 
the form of knowledge of the person.4 
Mr. Wasko lacked the continuous and familiar relationship with Ms. Conway necessary 
to allow for nonexpert testimony opining as to her competency. Mr. Wasko had a very limited 
knowledge of Ms. Conway prior to meeting in April 2004. The information he did have was 
obtained in the presence of Mr. Martin, who purportedly was the one who verified whether Ms. 
4 The Court may also find the facts of In re Brown's Estate, 61 Idaho 320, 101 P.2d 11 (1940) instructive on this 
point. cine Brown's Estate Court reviewed the testimony of several witnesses who spoke regarding the mental 
competency of Ms. Catherine Brown when she executed a will. Like the opinions discussed above, the Brown's 
Estate opinion recounts the continual and familiar relationship between Ms. Brown and the nonexpert witness, 
before providing that witness's opinion regarding Ms. Brown's competency at the time in question. 
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Conway's answers were accurate or not. Exh. Tr. 11/30/09, p.76, L.5-25 & p.77, L.1-5. Mr. 
Wasko had never met Ms. Conway before that meeting. He was unaware that she had been 
diagnosed with dementia. He was unaware of the existence or findings of the Physician's Report 
or the Visitor's Report from the guardianship proceeding. He had nothing with which to 
compare her conduct and even then, a poor foundation to make such a comparison. Finally, if 
Mr. Wasko's opinions were not based on training and experience, then his ability to testify 
regarding recollection of events is further called into question by his admitted health issues that 
have significantly impacted his ability to recall certain events accurately. The magistrate court 
abused its discretion when it overruled the foundation objection, and prejudiced Ms. Wooden by 
relying on that testimony in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
E. THE COURT MADE SEVERAL SIGNIFICANT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
FINDINGS OF FACT PREJUDICING MS. WOODEN 
Ms. Wooden challenges the magistrate court's findings that (1) Tanya Viers was a co-
guardian with Mr. Martin over Ms. Conway; (2) Mr. Martin only received an additional 3.3% of 
the estate as a result of the change in wills; and (3) Mr. Wasko inquired of Ms. Conway as to the 
extent of her property on the date she executed the 2004 Will. Mr. Martin concedes as clearly 
erroneous the magistrate court's findings that Ms. Viers was a co-guardian and the amount of 
Mr. Martin's increase as a result of the change in wills. Thus, the only question before the Court 
on those points is whether it can be said that they are, individually or cumulatively, harmless 
error. Mr. Mariin does assert that the record demonstrates that Mr. Wasko did inquire of Ms. 
Conway as to the extent of her property. This Reply Brief responds to that contention first. 
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1. Mr. Wasko Did Not Inquire Into Ms. Conway's Understanding of The 
Extent of Her Property on the Date the May 21, 2004 Will Was 
Executed 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Wooden set forth citations to the record showing that (a) the 
magistrate court found Mr. Wasko testified that Ms. Conway was aware of the extent of her 
property5; (b) that no such testimony was presented and that contrary evidence exists on the 
record in the form of Mr. Wasko's testimony at trial6 and in his deposition7; and (c) the 
magistrate court relied upon this alleged testimony in deciding the issues of capacity and undue 
influence 8. 
record: 
Mr. Martin responds by directing the Court's attention to the following passages of the 
Q. Did you ask her any questions about the extent of her property at 
that meeting? 
A. I do not recall ifl did or not. 
Q. Do you remember asking her questions about the extent of her 
property on that day? 
A. No, I do not. 
Exh. Tr. 11/30/09, p.81, L.5-10. 
Q. The question was, Mr. Wasko, that, isn't it true that you really 
couldn't fonn an opinion as to her testamentary capacity at the 
time of the signing because you hadn't asked her any questions 
with relation to the extent of her property? 
A. That would not stop me from reaching a conclusion. She had 
talked about her assets -- her money, but she didn't say the amount 
or anything like that. 
Q. She had talked to you about that before the 21st of May? 
5 R. Vol. 1, p. l 13, p. l l, L.20-22. 
6 Exh. Tr. 1 l /30/09, p.79, L.21-25 & p.81, L.5-10. 
7 Exh. Wasko Dep. p.60, L.1-10. 
8 R. Vol. I, p.113, p.11, L.20-22. 
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A. Yes, and also on the 21st of May. But she didn't say anything 
about the form of it or where it was. She just said her money. 
Q. And you didn't ask her any questions related to the extent of her 
property? 
A. No, because this was a continuing conversation we had since I first 
met her and discussed changes. 
Exh. Tr. 11/30/09, p.122, L.1-18. If anything, these statements support a finding that Mr. Wasko 
did not inquire into whether Ms. Conway was aware of the extent of her property. Mr. Wasko 
could not recall, and therefore would not state, that he had inquired into whether Ms. Conway 
was aware of the extent of her property. The magistrate court should go no further. 
2. The Admitted Errors Were Not Harmless 
Mr. Martin asks this Court to excuse the magistrate's court's erroneous findings on the 
ground that those findings were harmless error. Mr. Martin argues that the finding regarding Ms. 
Viers was harmless because "nowhere in the Court's decision is there an indication that the 
decision was influenced by a co-guardianship." Resp. Br. at 16. Mr. Martin argues that the 
erroneous finding regarding his increase in the estate is harmless because when his increase is 
considered in light of his children's decrease, it is not that significant. The record reveals these 
arguments as either false or post hoc rationalizations for the magistrate court's opinion. 
The magistrate court found it significant that Ms. Viers and Mr. Martin were co-
guardians over Ms. Conway. In finding that the presumption of undue influence did not apply to 
Mr. Martin, the magistrate court relied upon the limited nature of the guardianship; the court 
explained that Mr. Martin's guardianship was limited in that it was not a conservatorship and that 
it was shared with Ms. Viers. 9 The magistrate court found it material that Ms. Viers was a co-
9 R. Vol. I, p.116, p.23, L.5-13; p.117, p.25, L.15-20; & p.117, p.26, L.21-25. 
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guardian, but that Ms. Wooden had not offered evidence that Ms. Viers engaged in undue 
influence. Far from there being "no indication" that the court relied upon this finding, the court 
engages in a protracted analysis of that enoneous fact and relies upon it to determine whether the 
court will apply the presumption. 
Mr. Martin's reliance upon the decrease in disposition to his children is (1) a post hoc 
rationalization that was not relied upon by the magistrate court in forming its decision; 
(2) irrelevant to the determination of whether undue influence was exerted by him; and 
(3) speculative as to whether the effect of the change as to his children should be considered in 
connection with his increase. The magistrate court found the difference in disposition to Mr. 
Martin was not excessive because it was only 3.3%. 10 The increase was actually 10% (or, put 
another way, 150% of the previous disposition). This does not constitute harmless error. 
Mr. Martin asks the Court to affirm based upon speculation regarding what he would or 
would not have wanted for his own children. There was no evidence offered at trial in this 
regard. Furthermore, any decrease in disposition to Mr. Martin's children should not serve as an 
alternative ground for affirming because the magistrate court did not base its opinion upon that 
decrease. Additionally, Ms. Wooden alleged that Afr. Martin exerted undue influence on Ms. 
Conway; therefore, the change in disposition relevant to this inquiry is that which was enjoyed 
by Mr. Martin, not his children. 
The record unequivocally establishes that the magistrate court relied upon this disposition 
in making its finding. The magistrate court compared Ms. Wooden's decrease from 20% to 
approximately 1.4% of the estate with Mr. Martin's increase of 3.3% and found the alteration not 
10 R. Vol. I, p.117, p.25, L.15-20. 
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"disproportionate." Id. The degree to which the court's calculations were in error and the extent 
to which it relied upon them cannot be said to constitute harmless error. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Wooden asks this Court to hold that the independent and cumulative effect of the 
magistrate court's errors dictates a new trial be held. In his argument to the Court, Mr. Martin 
invites the Court to affirm an unclear ruling by reading a legal analysis into the record that 
simply does not exist. Mr. Martin also invites this Court to excuse erroneous rulings and 
findings through either post hoc justifications or a holding of harmless error. Ms. Wooden 
contends those arguments should be rejected. 
For the reasons set forth in the Appellant's Brief and this Reply Brief, Ms. Wooden asks 
the Supreme Court to remand this case for a new trial. 
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